Hermit Village or Zomian Republic? An update on the political socio-economy of a remote Himalayan community by Axelby, Richard
Hermit Village or Zomian republic? an update on 
the political socio-economy of a remote Himalayan 
community
Richard Axelby*
ABSTRACT
Hidden in a remote valley in Himachal Pradesh, the Village of Malana appears 
as a self-governing egalitarian community cosmologically committed to evading 
external influence. With its own system of village government and its own court for 
settling disputes, Malana enjoys a measure of village autonomy under its powerful 
tutelary deity, Jamlu. This article asks whether James Scott’s concept of ‘non-
state space’ can be extended to this isolated corner of the Indian Himalaya. Might 
Malana be a surviving example of what Pierre Clastres termed ‘a society against 
the state’? Why would the people of Malana opt for self-imposed isolation and how 
have they been able to maintain it? 
This paper follows the attempt made by Colin Rosser in the early 1950s to undertake 
ethnographic fieldwork in ‘the hermit village of Malana’. Reviewing Rosser’s efforts 
to solve the mystery of Malana’s physical, social and economic isolation, this paper 
considers changes in the society and economy of rural India and also in the ways 
in which anthropology as a discipline has approached these topics. Updating the 
story to the present permits a re-evaluation of Rosser’s finding as we consider how 
change has come to Malana village1. 
an anthropologist in the Valley of the Gods 
The Kullu valley possesses many striking examples of shikara style temples 
built in stone. Managed by a special class of hereditary priests, a large 
number of these temples are to be found in the former capitals of the 
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Kullu Rajas at Jagatsukh and Naggar. The most important temple is to be 
found in the district capital of Kullu town (formerly known as Sultanpur) 
which was the seat of the Kullu Rajas until 1847. The Raghunathji Temple 
houses the ruling deity of the valley of whom the Raja was considered 
the earthly representative. To the ordinary Kullui these imposing temples 
represent the imported religion of the Rajas and the Brahmins. Though 
these ‘new’ gods are respected, the feeling persists that the real gods of 
Kullu are to be found in the villages2. 
Each Kullu village, or group of neighbouring villages, has its own tutelary 
deity known as the devta or devi. These village gods are anthropomorphised 
so as to personify each village and share a common identity with the land 
and people. The substantial relations between the devtas and devis reflect 
the past and existing social relationships between the villages of which 
they are the supernatural personifications. These deities are believed to be 
related as siblings, or as father and son, mother and daughter, or husband 
and wife. 
The centre-piece of the ritual calendar in Kullu is the great annual 
Dussehra festival3. Carrying their associated deity on a palanquin, 
villagers from throughout the valley join a parade of over 200 gods 
on the Dhalpur maidan in Kullu town. Held in honour of Raghunathji, 
at Dussehra the people of Kullu pay homage to the Kullu Raja. This 
reading extends to suggest assimilation into a greater Hindusim as the 
indigenous devtas and devis bow down before the imported god of the 
Rajas (Berti 2006: 61). 
At the great Dussehra festival however one god stands apart. Jamlu, 
the god of Malana village, does not enter Kullu town but instead maintains 
a detached position on the far bank of the river Beas. 
Kullui tradition places Jamlu’s origins somewhere to the north of the 
Himalayan range. The god wandered through the mountains until, after 
many years, he reached the Hampta Pass which looks down into Kullu. The 
Kullu gods didn’t want Jamlu to settle in their valley so, as Jamlu crossed 
2 ‘In contrast with Raghunath, whom oral stories present as an outsider brought to Kullu 
by a seventeenth-century Raja, village deities are mostly depicted as ‘autochtonous’ of 
the region, or at least as being already there before the beginning and the consolidation 
of the royal dynasty’ (Berti 2006: 45).
3 See Luchesi 2006 for an extended description of the Kullu Dussehra festival and the 
relationship between Lord Raghunath and the village deities. 
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a swing bridge in a basket, the Kullu gods administered a collective kick 
to the basket which, with Jamlu in it, soared into the air and over the 
mountains, finally landing in the Malana glen. This legend explains why, 
in relation to the other deities that reside in Kullu, Jamlu occupies an 
independent and, in some respects, hostile position. 
Jamlu’s refusal to attend the Dushera fair is a mythological reflection 
of the relationship that exists between the people of Malana village and 
the wider world - they, like Jamlu, occupy an independent and, in some 
respects, hostile position. But, in the words of Colin Rosser who conducted 
fieldwork in Malana in the early 1950s: ‘Jamlu’s mythological exclusion 
from Kullu does not result in his exclusion from the Kullu pantheon... 
Indeed he is widely and commonly referred to by Kullu villagers as “the 
most powerful” of all Kullu gods’ (1956: 63-64).
This article follows the attempt made by the Welsh Anthropologist 
Colin Rosser to undertake ethnographic fieldwork in ‘the hermit village 
of Malana’. Rosser found there a self-governing egalitarian community 
cosmologically committed to evading external influence. Here I compare 
Rosser’s depiction of Malana against recent academic thinking on stateless 
societies; in particular James C. Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed (2009). 
Scott’s argument is that people in upland Southeast Asia can only be 
understood in relation to larger and more powerful political entities. To 
Scott all aspects of hill communities can be seen as predicated on resisting 
forms of state intrusion and control. In order to escape the projects of 
organized state societies – slavery, taxation, conscription - Scott describes 
the disparate people of Zomia as having created a variety of stateless 
societies. Drawing on Rosser’s work on Malana I ask whether Scott’s 
concept of ‘non-state space’ should be extended to this isolated corner of 
the Indian Himalaya. Might Malana be a surviving example of what Pierre 
Clastres (1989) identified as ‘a society against the state’? Why would the 
people of Malana opt for self-imposed isolation and how have they been 
able to maintain it? 
My argument proceeds in three parts. First I outline Rosser’s fieldwork 
and his initial account of Malana (1952)4 and draw a number of comparisons 
with James C. Scott’s recent writings on stateless societies. The second 
section contrasts Rosser’s 1952 article against his PhD thesis (1956) in 
4 Also printed in Srinivas’s edited collection India’s Villages (1955).
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which he sought to solve the mystery of Malana’s economic, social and 
political isolation. Finally by updating the story to the present we are 
able to re-evaluate Rosser’s finding to consider how change has come to 
Malana village. Here Rosser’s accounts aid an appreciation of Malana’s 
political engagement with wider polities, the workings of transnational 
economies and how identity and ethnicity might be used to manage both 
engagement and separation. 
the ‘wild and jungli’ hermit village of Malana
In an article published in The Economic Weekly Colin Rosser describes the 
villages of the Kullu5 valley as sharing underlying uniformities of social 
life ‘such that no villager need feel uncomfortable or out of place should 
he visit one of the villages in the neighbouring valleys. He may feel a 
stranger but not an alien’. There is though one exception to this rule 
for he adds that these remarks do not apply to the village of Malana 
which, ‘though located administratively in Kullu tahsil, is unique in 
Kullu’ (1952: 477). 
A day’s walk from its closest neighbour, Rosser found Malana ‘perched, 
at an altitude of just under 9000 feet above sea level, on a narrow shelf 
high on one side of a wild and isolated glen surrounded by formidable 
mountain ranges’ (1956: 1): 
High pastures, dense forests, jagged rock outcrops forming sheer cliff 
faces, numerous small streams plunging over high waterfalls down to 
the main Malana torrent, precipitous slopes, and finally an eight-mile 
long gorge closing the exit – these are the chief characteristics of the 
terrain inhabited by the Malanis (ibid: 89). 
The extreme physical isolation of Malana is stressed by Rosser because 
of its great consequences when considering the social organisation of its 
inhabitants. Malana could not be called a typical Kullu village. Though the 
Malanis6 spoke Kulluhi7 in their dealings with outsiders, within the village 
5 To maintain consistency I have rendered Rosser’s spelling of ‘Kulu’ to the contemporary 
‘Kullu’. 
6 Following Rosser I have used ‘Malanis’ as the collective term for the people of Malana 
village. 
7 A Western Pahari language. 
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they used their own language called Kanashi. Kanashi is not spoken or 
understood by any Kullu villager other than the Malanis: ‘it automatically 
marks all non-Malanis as alien’ (Rosser 1952: 477). 
Rosser also found the Malanis’ kinship organisation to be fundamentally 
different from that found in the typical Kullu village. Elsewhere in Kullu, 
Rosser describes a ‘fundamental cleavage’ between the clean castes 
[bhitarka or handarka meaning of the inner circle] on the one hand and the 
unclean castes [baharka meaning outsiders] on the other (1956: 14-15). For 
the most part this cleavage did not exist within the village of Malana for 
‘the Malanis do not bother very much about the finer distinctions of caste 
differentiation’. Rather the people of Malana ‘regulate their behaviour 
towards all Kullu villagers outside their own glen in terms of this bhitarka 
/ baharka groupings of castes’ (ibid: 16). Thus, when visiting other villages 
in Kullu and when receiving visitors in their own village, the people of 
Malana ‘appear to act as if they belonged to a caste apart from all others’ 
(ibid: 48). This division also determined marriage practices: through the 
practice of village endogamy they further insulated themselves against 
social contacts from the outside. 
Perhaps most strikingly, the Malanis saw physical contact with all 
outsiders as highly polluting. Visitors to Malana, including Rosser, were 
forbidden from touching people, possessions or buildings; they were not 
allowed to bring leather items into the village; nor were they permitted 
to walk on certain village footpaths8. Any transgression of these rules was 
punishable by a stiff fine. ‘Malana stands alone: independent, autonomous, 
“different” in the eyes of Kullu people, and certainly in the Malanis’ own 
estimation’ (Rosser 1952: 477)
The result of this physical, linguistic and social isolation was that 
Malana ‘has been left more or less to govern itself’ (Rosser 1956: 33). The 
Rajas of Kullu avoided interfering in the affairs of Malana and recognised 
it as a place of sanctuary for criminals and offenders bent on escaping 
punishment. This continued to be the case during the period of British 
rule: ‘the village has been largely ignored by the Government and is rarely 
visited by Government officials from Kullu’ (Rosser 1952: 477). Enjoying 
a kind of de facto independence, Malana ‘has its own system of village 
government, its own court for settling disputes, and a measure of village 
8 This last rule was relaxed in Rosser’s case after the first few months (Rosser 1956: 49).
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autonomy quite distinct from that of other Kullu villages which have 
all been drawn into the official administrative system of Government 
departments and courts’ (ibid: 477). 
Having spent several months in the Kullu valley prior to proceeding to 
Malana, Rosser had collected accounts of how the people of this isolated 
settlement were viewed by their neighbours. 
It is certainly true to say that the Kullu villagers regard the Malanis as 
a group which stands outside the main stream of social life in Kullu; 
a group which is strange, foreign even, and without parallel in other 
Kullu villages however remote. ....The Malanis are regarded as wild 
and uncanny by their Kullu neighbours.... In many of their customs 
they appear backward and ‘jungli’ to the much more sophisticated 
Kullu villager (Rosser 1956: 45).
An example of this wild or ‘jungli’ behaviour was provided by the Malani 
insistence on barter. When engaging in trade, ‘they will never accept 
money for wool, and often not for ghi, but go from village to village in 
the hope of getting their customary barter rates for these articles’. This 
‘obsessional adherence to tradition’ according to Rosser led to behaviour 
which was often glaringly ‘uneconomic’ and encouraged the view among 
‘the more sophisticated Kullu villagers’ that the Malanis were excessively 
backward and primitive’ (ibid: 112). Malana was regarded as a throwback 
to an earlier more primitive age that existed before the rise of regional 
states and prior to the possibilities of market exchange. 
Though Rosser describes the Malanis’ ‘excessive primitiveness’ as 
being the cause of much amusement in the village of Kullu, he caught in 
this laughter a hollow note (1952: 482):
Garbled, exaggerated accounts of some of the more dramatic and 
esoteric aspects of Malani culture are a frequent feature of Kullu 
conversation whenever the enigma of Malana is under discussion. It is 
apparent that the attitudes of Kullu villagers towards the Malanis are a 
mixture of humour and mocker[y] (because of their “backwardness”) 
and awe and even fear (because of their close association with a 
powerful god, their strange customs, and their almost uncanny group 
solidarity) (Rosser 1956: 45-46).
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Throughout Kullu, Malana was (and remains) known as ‘the home of “a 
different kind of people”’ (Rosser 1952: 477). 
If the people of Kullu saw the inhabitants of Malana as distinct from 
the main stream of social life, the feeling was undoubtedly shared by 
the Malanis themselves. Topographically, culturally and politically, 
Kullu represents for Malana its external environment; Rosser wrote of 
the term ‘Kullu’ being used by the Malanis to refer to the world beyond 
their valley:
The people of Malana have developed an almost fanatical sense 
of difference, of village cohesion and of intense group loyalty. All 
who do not “belong” are treated with virulent suspicion and even 
contempt. There is not the least doubt that on reaching Malana from 
Kullu, one enters a cultural “atmosphere” quite distinct from, and 
sharply contrasted with, that of Kullu. This distinction can perhaps 
be best conveyed by stating that with Malana, though it consists 
only of one village, one is dealing with a self-contained tribal society 
as opposed to the village or folk society of Kullu (1956: 50, emphasis 
in original).
This was the Malana that Colin Rosser sought permission to enter. The 
reasons for wanting to visit were obvious for: ‘as a unit of study for the 
anthropologist it emerges from its background with singular clarity’ (ibid: 
49-50). But, singular clarity or not, it was a unit that was resistant to being 
subjected to ethnographic study. 
Knowing it was impossible to obtain the use of a Malani house, Rosser 
had devised a plan to build a small hut on the edge of the village. After 
negotiation with the Malani council lasting nearly three months, Rosser 
succeeded in obtaining a plot of land. This site was levelled and three trees 
cut down and turned into planks. At this point, the more conservative 
faction within Malana decisively denied him permission to reside within 
the village9. Realising that any attempt to settle in Malana could only 
succeed ‘at the cost of alienating at least half the village’ (ibid: 457-458), 
Rosser spent the worst of the winter in neighbouring Jari. He wrote: ‘The 
9 Visiting Malana in September 2013 I was told that a group of Malana people had 
deliberately destroyed Rosser’s half-built hut. 
42 EBHR-46
failure of the plan cost me a good deal of time, effort and money – but 
taught me much about the way the political system works in practice’ 
(ibid: 455).
From his wintry tent at the foot of the Malana glen Rosser was able to 
reflect on what he had learned in his first six months in Kullu. The resulting 
account was submitted for publication in The Economic Weekly. In it he writes 
of the intense solidarity and isolation of the people of Malana reflected 
in feelings of equality and similarity. His census of the 119 households 
in Malana recorded 116 families organized into eight patrilineal clans 
(these defined the exogamous units for marriage). Significantly all these 
clans intermingled quite freely and considered themselves equal. Rosser 
suggested two factors contributed to this feeling of village egalitarianism: 
first because of the closely connected ties of kinship (village endogamy 
meant that everyone was related to each other in multiple ways), and 
second because of the lack of economic differentiation (all households 
practiced a combination of agriculture and pastoralism). It was this caste 
and economic homogeneity that allowed the village to function as a ritual 
and political unit (Rosser 1955: 72). 
The isolation, independence and egalitarianism of Malana were 
personified in the powerful tutelary deity of the village: Jamlu. 
Jamlu... dominates and pervades the whole village. In his worship, 
the unity and solidarity of the village are strikingly and elaborately 
expressed. Jamlu is the ultimate authority, and the source of power, in 
the political, judicial, and religious spheres... To an important extent, 
Jamlu can be regarded as the deification of the village, and as the 
apotheosis of the villagers (Rosser 1952: 479).
While the caste divisions found elsewhere in Kullu were not present in 
Malana, there did exist a complex social system that divided the village 
territorially into two separate areas of habitation: Dhara Behr and Sara 
Behr. Of these two it was the more conservative Sara Behr that had 
objected to Rosser’s attempt to reside in the village. Between the two behrs 
was a neutral area known as the harchar: ‘this central area is of the utmost 
importance since it is the territorial hub of the village upon which turns 
the whole political and judicial organization’ (ibid: 477). At one end of the 
harchar was the main temple of the village; in the centre of the square a 
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sacred stone represented Jamlu; and at the far end of this main temple 
square the village council met.
Rosser’s 1952 article in The Economic Weekly provides a detailed 
description of the village council. Decisions over village matters were 
made by three permanent hereditary post-holders (collectively known as 
the mundie) and eight elected elders (called jestas). Following discussion 
all decisions would be put before an assembly of all the household 
heads (chakars) who could express their approval or disapproval. With 
decisions needing to be unanimous Rosser was witness to a good deal of 
‘procrastination, compromise and modification’. Where unanimity was not 
reached the case was either dropped, shelved or when urgent, the council 
agreed ‘to put the problem directly to Jamlu himself through a particular 
procedure involving an ordeal by poison, a goat being substituted for each 
party to the dispute’ (Rosser 1956: 320)
Though from the outside Malana might appear strongly unified, Rosser 
identifies a constant internal struggle for power between the Karmisht, 
Pujara and Gur10 based on the dual territorial division between the two behrs 
(1952: 482). Rosser theorised that the major motive force of the Malani 
system of government was to achieve and maintain equilibrium between 
structurally equivalent segments: ‘the Malanis have evolved a political 
system characterised by a strong centralised authority inseparably 
associated with an arrangement of balances between homogenous, 
structurally equivalent segments’ (1956: i). 
This egalitarianism is functionally related to the subordination to 
Jamlu. In so far as the god is seen as possessing a monopoly of power - 
which is delegated to human office-holders – the struggle for power is 
severely limited and restricted. It expresses itself rather as a struggle 
to maintain equality. In essence, this is what happens in Malana. 
Integration is achieved, as it were, through putting political power 
beyond the reach of individuals and groups. None can dominate 
because all are dominated [by Jamlu] (ibid: 513-514).
Stressing the extreme homogeneity of Malana and its separation from 
10 Rosser describes these three positions are being, respectively, that of Jamlu’s estate 
agent, priest and oracle (1956: 342).
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the wider world, Rosser describes not a village but a traditional ‘self-
contained tribal society’ (ibid: 50). In emphasizing the tribe above the 
village, mechanical over organic solidarity, Rosser stood apart from the 
intellectual and geographical concerns of the new wave of sociologists 
and anthropologists studying India’s villages in the 1950s. While his 
contemporaries were interested in social transformations demonstrated 
through the interaction of caste and class, Rosser’s account is unconcerned 
with the kinds of changes brought about by incorporation into wider 
economic and political systems. While Rosser detailed the mechanical 
solidarity of ‘tradition’, others were exploring new approaches to a 
rural India that was rapidly becoming ‘modern’. With its clear structural 
definition, economic self-sufficiency, political solidarity, and strong 
sense of ritual integrity, Malana appears as a prime example of the ‘little 
communities’ of rural India that Marriott identified as disappearing in 
the face of foreign and urban influence (1955: 172). Some might see the 
people of Malana as existing on one side of a great divide: their insistence 
on barter marked them out as economically primitive; their tradition 
of village governance an unsophisticated throwback. The account 
forwarded by Rosser however may be read another way. Somewhat 
unfashionable compared to the fast-moving inter-connected circles of 
1950s ethnography, Rosser’s depiction of Malana now seems to locate it 
squarely within the kind of stateless space that has more recently been 
most prominently charted by Willem van Schendel and James C. Scott. 
As a critique of ‘classical’ area studies and a way to draw attention 
to the neglected areas and societies that exist on the periphery of states 
and civilization, the concept of Zomia was placed firmly on the map by 
Williem van Schendel (2002). Outlining a new framing for Asian studies, 
van Schendel’s Zomia extended from the highlands of Vietnam across 
the South-East Asian massif and into the Himalayas as far as Afghanistan. 
‘Borderland societies’ in Zomia and elsewhere are characterised as being 
socioculturally, linguistically, economically and politically distinctive; 
‘borderland people’, according to Baud and van Schendel, feel ‘ethnically 
and emotionally part of another, nonstate entity’ (1997: 227 and 233). 
Of the wave of borderlands studies inspired by this rethinking of state 
and non-state space perhaps the best known is the ‘anarchist history’ of 
upland South-East Asia forwarded in Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed. 
Scott argues that hill peoples cannot be understood in isolation but only 
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relationally and positionally with respect to larger and more powerful 
political entities (2009: 32). He describes Zomia as a splinter zone made 
up of peoples who have fled from oppressive regimes of state control and 
created a variety of stateless societies. While Scott’s Zomia extends no 
further than the highlands of South-East Asia, Malana seems very similar to 
its independent and egalitarian communities residing in ‘non-state space’11.
To Scott all aspects of ‘tribal’ communities can be seen as predicated 
on resisting forms of state intrusion and control. Highlighting the history 
of ‘deliberate and reactive statelessness’ in South East Asia, Scott reverses 
conventional narratives of incorporation into regional, national and 
international economic and political systems. Following Pierre Clastres 
(1974), he argues that ‘stateless peoples’ are not unaware or without contact 
but rather have made a decision to remain separate from forms of political 
organization beyond the level of the immediate community. Anarchic 
and acephalous, these communities practice forms of ‘escape agriculture’ 
whose slipperiness offers little purchase to the grasping hands of state 
power with its regimes of tax- and slave-collection. From this perspective 
tribal communities are not leftovers from a primitive past but have made 
a political decision to actively rebuff a state they view as predatory and 
extractive. In exploring these dynamics, Scott has rescued hill peoples 
from assumptions of stasis, primitivisim, essentialism, and isolation and 
given them ‘voice, agency, and rationality’ (Lieberman 2010: 336). 
Could Malana’s unique culture be understood as an example of 
ethnogenesis, a collective identity deliberately engineered in response to 
a particular political problem? Maintaining and emphasising a separate 
and bounded tribal identity against efforts to force them to assimilate, 
the Malanis would appear to be, to use Scott’s term, ‘barbarians by design’ 
(2009: 8). Given their egalitarianism and their explicit rejection of the 
logic of the state and the market, could Malana be another example of the 
kinds of anarchistic societies identified by Graeber (2004: 23-29)? A closer 
examination of Malana does not bear out some of these stronger claims 
about ‘anarchistic’ borderlanders, but the village and its inhabitants 
can indeed contribute to broader understanding of the complexity of 
11  Pointing to the area as a haven for refugees from oppressive states Shneiderman (2010) 
asks whether Zomia might be extended into the Central Himalayas. Extending this point 
the contributors to David Gellner’s 2013 edited collection look specifically at borderland 
lives in the new sub-region of ‘Northern South Asia’.
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the politics of geographical and social spaces which the state finds hard 
to reach. Borderlands, according to Baud and van Schendel, are not a 
simple zone where ‘us’ stops and ‘them’ starts. They can also be a space 
of agency, the realization of which can have ‘unintended and subversive 
consequences’ (1997:212). There is more to Malana than meets the eye, as 
Rosser was to discover. 
a Himalayan Mystery
Like many of his contemporaries Colin Rosser submitted an initial account 
of his research for publication in The Economic Weekly. ‘A Hermit Village in 
Kullu’ was first published in 1952 and, three years later was gathered with 
other similar accounts in M.N. Srinivas’ edited survey of India’s Villages 
(1955). 
In his introduction to India’s Villages Srinivas makes clear that some 
of the articles contained within ‘are tentative in the extreme’ often 
being ‘written...while the field-work was still in progress’ (1960: 1). 
Later findings, cautions Srinivas, may ‘modify, and even occasionally 
contradict’ the information collected earlier (1960: 1). It becomes clear, 
reading Rosser’s 1956 doctoral thesis, that his initial account (and only 
published one) was based on only a very limited acquaintance with the 
village. Rosser arrived in Kullu in 1951; his attempt to build a hut on the 
outskirts of Malana failed in the autumn of that year. As the piece in The 
Economic Weekly was published in May of 1952 it could scarcely contain any 
information gathered by Rosser while actually residing in Malana. Absent 
from the collection brought together by Srinivas, an introductory note 
from the Editor of The Economic Weekly makes it clear that, though ‘the 
author [Rosser] spent the past year in carrying out a field study in Kullu’ 
he was yet to commence his planned ‘intensive analysis of the village 
about which he writes’ (i.e. Malana). Instead the 1952 account that made 
its way into India’s Villages via The Economic Weekly is based on Rosser’s 
negotiations with the Malanis, on archival and official accounts and, in 
particular, on the views of the Kulluis’ among whom Rosser lived before 
moving to Malana. In short, Rosser’s 1952 account of the hermit village 
of Malana was produced at a distance and drew largely on the opinions 
of people living elsewhere in Kullu. There are direct parallels here with 
some of the key criticisms of Scott’s work on the ‘anarchist’ highland 
communities of South East Asia, namely that it doesn’t direct significant 
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attention to the views of the actual people it discusses (Lieberman 2010: 
336; Karlsson 2013: 323). If there is an absence of Malani voices in Rosser’s 
initial account, his 1956 doctoral thesis more than compensates. 
Having had his initial request rejected, Rosser persevered in his efforts 
to reside in Malana. Abandoning the attempt to construct a wooden 
house, Rosser petitioned the assembly to be allowed to return after the 
winter and live in a tent. Eventually, in the spring of 1952, the Sara Behr 
faction relented and Rosser finally gained permission to pitch his tent on 
the edge of the village. As we shall see, the months of actual residence in 
Malana caused Rosser to reassess his earlier depiction of the Malanis as 
economically isolated and politically separate. Reading Rosser’s doctoral 
thesis it becomes clear that there was more to Malana than he revealed 
in the article in The Economic Weekly. While the 1952 account describes 
how outsiders viewed the people of Malana, his 1956 thesis outlines why 
it suited the Malanis to be viewed that way. 
In the opening chapter of his thesis Rosser provides a geographic 
description of Kullu which divides cultivation in the valley into three 
zones each associated with particular types of village: 
a) The bal or low-lying lands of the Beas valley which contains irrigated 
land suitable for rice cultivation. Although it is rare to find villages of 
more than 100 households, still, villages of up to 150 households are 
sometimes found in this zone.
b) The manjhat or ‘mid-zone’ in which two crops are produced annually 
usually of wheat and barley. Villages are smaller than in the bal but 
larger than those in the gahar.
c) The gahar or ‘highland zone’: ‘The smallest villages of Kullu – mere 
hamlets of 10-15 households – are found perched high on the ridges... at 
altitudes of up to 9000 feet. Here land is scarce, poor in quality, difficult 
to till because of the steep slopes, and the altitude permits only one crop 
annually – and even this is imperilled by the possibility of late snow 
during severe winters. In these difficult conditions, it is not unnatural 
that these high villages should be extremely small in size’ (1956: 9).
Herein lies the mystery that Rosser sets out to solve. At 9000 feet Malana 
is one of the highest Kullu villages and would be expected to reflect the 
same difficult ecological conditions experienced by the upper villages 
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of the gahar. Yet with the 112 households12, Malana compared very well 
in size with the most favoured villages situated on the fertile bal land. 
The solution to the riddle of Malana’s elevated existence, unmentioned 
in Rosser’s Economic Weekly paper, is solved in his doctoral thesis. Here 
Malana is revealed to be considerably less self-sufficient and more 
outwardly turned than its image might suggest. 
In feudal times the various Rajas of Kullu would make gifts of muafi or 
revenue estates to those who they wished to reward or appease. Alongside 
the nobles of the Kullu Rajas’ court, these gifts might be extended to 
village gods. The more powerful a god, the more the Rajas would seek 
to buy his or her favour. Noting this system in his Settlement Report of 
1874, J.B. Lyall wrote that by granting these lands as endowments, the 
Raja ‘divested himself of his lordship and proprietorship. The cultivators 
thenceforward paid rent and did service in respect of such lands to the 
shrine and not to the Raja’ (1874: 157). Since the deity of Malana village was 
believed throughout Kullu to be particularly powerful (and exceedingly 
vengeful when angered) it made sense that ‘all the lands in the Malana 
glen were granted to Jamlu by the Rajas’ (ibid: 34-35). Furthermore Jamlu 
was made overlord of a very considerable quantity of different types of 
land in villages scattered in the main Beas valley and in Wazeeri Rupi to 
the south (Rosser 1956: 77). The grant having been made, the Malanis were 
entitled to collect revenue on behalf of Jamlu. Known as kar, a share of the 
rice and barley13 grown in the tributary villages would be carried back 
to the god’s treasury at Malana. Rosser immediately recognised this as ‘a 
vital contribution to the Malani economy... and is a partial explanation of 
[how] though one of the highest villages in Kullu, Malana is also one of the 
largest’ (ibid: 84). 
The Malanis were well aware that without this kar and the 
accompanying ‘offerings’ they would be faced with a profound economic 
and social crisis. 
The economic necessity to the Malanis of this external food supply 
serves to reinforce in their minds their almost fanatical belief in 
12  The 116 households of the 1952 survey had, by now, been revised down: Rosser (1956: 
48) records a total of 112 households of which 109 were Kanet, 1 Julahas (weavers) and 2 
Lohars (ironsmiths)
13  Rosser estimates the total kar to be worth in the region of Indian Rupees (INR) 4256 at 
Kullu market weights.
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the power of the god, to magnify their dependence on him, and 
to confirm their conviction that they are the only real devotees of 
Jamlu, enduring under his divine protection…. The Malani obsession 
with the god, their complete submission to what they believe to be 
his will, and their fear of, and dependence on, his power are facts 
which are unquestionably fundamental to an analysis of the Malani 
social system. This fervent religiosity is woven into the whole fabric 
of Malani society. The study of Malana is essentially the study of the 
cult of Jamlu: they are one (ibid: 85).
The major revelation of Rosser’s doctoral thesis was his detailed 
description of the kinds of elaborate practices that ensured the collection 
of rent on Jamlu’s muafi land: 
Twice a year, the Malanis descend in force from their mountain 
stronghold to collect the kar or rent due from the tenants. The 
strong force of Malanis, some 60-80 in number, is greatly feared by 
the villagers concerned who have come to dread these bi-annual 
visitations. The Malanis,.... invade – this is scarcely too strong a term 
– the village, intimidate the villagers, insist on being supplied with 
free meals for several days.... and also, and this is the significant point, 
demand that the kar due shall be measured in a special basaju which 
they bring with them (ibid: 78-79). 
Significantly this basaju was twice the normal size; this allowed the 
Malanis to extract double the amount that was owed to them. 
The arrival of a large party of wild-looking Malanis, jabbering in a 
foreign tongue, the envoys of “the most powerful” of all the Kullu 
devtas, is a somewhat awe-inspiring event for the small Kullu village 
which may consist of only fifteen to twenty households. The villagers 
undoubtedly consider the Malanis as being wild, uncanny and often 
dangerously mad (a fiction which the Malanis appear to encourage as 
it aids them in the collection of the maximum rent) (ibid: 80). 
It seems that in the 1950s (and indeed for a long time prior) Malana was 
not isolated or self-sufficient but depended on a very particular form 
50 EBHR-46
of engagement with the wider world. Recognising Malana’s isolation 
as ‘a fiction’, Rosser establishes its dependence on an extended set of 
cosmological and economic relationships. Paradoxically the successful 
management of these relations required the projection of a collective 
image as fearsome, dangerous and different. Jamlu both symbolised 
Malana’s separation and made it possible. 
While there is much of value and interest in Clastres’ and Scott’s 
approaches, they arguably exaggerate the extent and form of separation 
of communities that place themselves outside of state control. Olivier de 
Sardan (2005: 79) reminds us to be wary of stereotypes of uncaptured, 
restive and rebellious peasants, their resistance to external authority 
and their supposed refusal to enter modern markets. At the core of 
Scott’s analysis is the binary distinction between the valley and the 
hills. This division largely corresponds to the delineation between state 
and nonstate spaces. Scott’s major revelation in The Art of Not Being 
Governed is that highland and lowland are not separate zones but zones 
that are defined and produced by their opposite. On initial viewing 
it might appear that, like all good Zomians, the economic and social 
institutions of the Malanis were premised on a desire to keep the state 
away. However, it is inadequate to define Malana in Clastres’ terms as a 
‘society against the state’. Read against the evidence of Rosser’s second 
account it becomes clear that the relationships that hill people develop 
with lowland state societies are more complex and ambiguous than 
Scott or Clastres allow. Forsyth and Michaud argue for a more refined 
reflection and a more dynamic understanding of the relationships 
between (marginal) local subjects, (global) market forces, and (national) 
states: ‘people on the margins do not just get onboard and accept… 
modernity, but, rather, use their agency to maintain direction over their 
lives and livelihoods’ (2011: 3). To Scott the entire societal design of hill 
populations can be understood as an act of resistance aimed at keeping 
oppressive lowland states at a distance. Another way to look at Malana 
(which is interconnected with but distinct from the hill populations 
described by Scott) is that the entire social and cosmological structure 
of the village was designed to facilitate the extraction of tribute from 
neighbouring villages. Strong social boundaries allowed the people of 
Malana to engage to their advantage economically and politically with 
the wider society.
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What is clear is that the Malana that was opened up to Rosser in 1952 
had a record of success in managing its relations with the pre-colonial, 
colonial and immediately post-colonial state. However, the system through 
which the Malanis had maintained their separation was vulnerable to the 
sorts of changes occuring in India after Independence. Already in 1950s 
questions about the legality of collecting muafi were being raised. Rosser 
considers how change would affect Malana.
The Malanis are obviously well alive to the crucial part played by this 
external food supply in their whole economy, and are intensely afraid 
that if the exact details [of the extraction] of this kar reached the ears 
of the Government in Kullu town, measures might be taken.... which 
would be extremely damaging to the Malani economy (Rosser 1956: 
82). 
There is no doubt that the abolition of Jamlu’s muafi would [also] 
have the most severe and far-reaching effects on the social system 
of Malana and might well initiate a major process of social change. 
The economy would suffer a damaging blow, but probably equally 
important would be the effect on the deep-seated beliefs in the power 
of the god (ibid: 86-87).
What Rosser chose to do with the information he had gained about such a 
vital component of the Malani economy would seem to more than justify 
the initial suspicions held by the people of Malana: 
Just before I left Kullu in December 1952 I discussed this subject with 
the sub-Divisional Officer in charge there. He explained that it was 
the Government view that the very large loss of revenue resulting 
from the alienation of lands to temples could not be justified. The 
view was that the expenses of a particular cult should be borne by the 
devotees concerned, and not by the Government as was the present 
case where revenues which should be collected in the normal way 
now was paid into the cult treasury, there to be used for the expenses 
of ceremonies and the remuneration of services. I was told that it was 
the Government’s intention to abolish all muafis “in the near future”, 
to confirm the present tenants in their occupancy, and to collect from 
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them the normal land revenue according to the current assessment 
(ibid: 86).
In The Art of Not Being Governed Scott specifies a time limit for statelessness. 
Since 1945, and in some cases before then, the power of the state to 
deploy distance-demolishing technologies – railroads, all-weather 
roads, telephone, telegraphy, airpower, helicopters, and now 
information technology – so changed the strategic balance of power 
between self-governing peoples and nation-states, so diminished the 
friction of terrain, that my analysis largely ceases to be useful. On the 
contrary, the sovereign nation-state is now busy projecting its power 
to its outermost territorial borders and mopping up zones of weak or 
no sovereignty (2009: xii).
In newly independent India, state-promoted development would be 
expected to transform their political, economic and social isolation and 
assimilate Malana notionally into a national mainstream. Rosser arrived 
in Malana precisely when this very hinge in its history was being opened. 
The situation he described is one where a degree of separation from 
the state was still possible. The next section updates the story and asks 
how this cohesive and fiercely independent community reacted to new 
systems of government and how the dynamics of Zomia are challenged by 
new technologies of control. 
Hermits or hippies? the economics of fictive isolation. 
In 1995 a batch of Malana Cream entered into Amsterdam’s prestigious 
Cannabis Cup was adjudged to be one of the two finest hashish smokes 
in the world14. ‘Bush Doctor’ in his ‘Smokers Guide to Amsterdam’ describes 
Malana Cream as boasting ‘an unusually soft and smooth inhale, with 
flavors like a chocolate biscuit’ that yield ‘an excellent body high, without 
dopey feelings,’ and leaving ‘a bit of a numb feeling on the back of the 
14 http://www.thctalk.com/cannabis-forum/showthread.php?3987-High-Times-
Cannabis-Cup-Winners-1988-2007&s=2467d3ba6d82c763fd0e5ef044696175 and http://
www.therealseedcompany.com/products.php?product_id=15, both accessed 2nd 
August 2015.
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throat that has you reaching for a cool bevie from the juicebar’15. It would 
seem that the village of Malana was, by the mid-1990s, operating as part 
of the global economy. It is noticeable that in his thorough review of 
agricultural production in 1950s Malana at no point does Rosser mention 
cannabis (1956: 89-92). 
Over the last sixty or seventy years return visits and fresh studies of 
sites first described in the 1950s have provided long-term perspectives 
on political, social and economic changes in Indian village life. Offering 
often critical insights into anthropologists’ methodological approaches, 
suggesting how these contribute to particular understandings, and 
how they have changed over time, such studies open windows into the 
intellectual and disciplinary history of Indian anthropology and sociology. 
Rosser and his depiction of Malana seems a good way to explore and 
examine ideas about tradition and modernity both in rural India and in 
the discipline of anthropology. The remainder of this article offers not to 
study this particular village again but to revisit Rosser’s work in order to 
reflect on the nature of change experienced in Malana and the capacity of 
the people of Malana to respond to change.
In September 2013 I approached Malana village by the same route 
that Rosser covered on foot over sixty years previously. It is no longer 
necessary to make a day’s walk from Jari to reach the village; a jeep-able 
road carved into the walls of the Malana valley comes within an easy stroll 
to it. The road was built to support a series of hydro-power projects that 
tame the waters of the Malana River. To reach Malana I had to pass through 
a check-point stationed outside the offices of the Forest Department, and 
a police post. 
Today’s visitors do not need to request permission to enter Malana, 
nor are they required to remove leather shoes and belts at the edge of the 
village. However the strict pollution taboos remain in evidence: a series 
of signs posted on the Harchar and the Temple warns that attempting to 
touch or photograph the building will result in an IRS 2500 fine. Physically 
touching the residents of Malana or any of their possessions is similarly 
to be avoided. 
The basic layout of the village is still apparent, with the Harchar and 
15 http://www.outsideonline.com/adventure-travel/asia/india/Bad-Trip.html accessed 
2nd August 2015. 
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temple square separating the Sara Behr and Dhara Behr sections. However, 
the appearance of the village has altered since the 1950s: many of the old 
wooden houses16 apparent in Rosser’s photographs have been replaced 
by concrete structures, slate roofs are now tin and satellite dishes hang 
from the eaves of several houses. There is a government school, and the 
large red building in the centre of the village had been built by Malana’s 
Pradhan17. A series of seven guesthouses now ring the village, which 
seems significant given the difficulties Rosser had when wanting to live 
there. These cheap hotels cater to backpackers who are drawn to Malana 
by the mountain scenery and the air of exotic mystery that pervades 
the village. And, of course, there is the added attraction of a cheap and 
plentiful supply of high quality hash.18
The commercial cultivation of cannabis was adopted by the people 
of Malana at some point in the late 1970s. The climate of the southern 
foothills of the Himalayas is well suited to growing cannabis and that 
produced in the Pin Parbati valley is of particularly high quality. Malani 
accounts tell of an Italian by the name of ‘Glenu’19 who took up residence20 
in the village and taught them how to make charas using the ‘hand-rubbed’ 
technique to draw resin from the plant by massaging each flowering leaf 
between the palm and fingers. While some of this cash crop is sold directly 
to tourists much is exported across India and overseas.21 
Societies without a state are commonly classed as societies based on 
subsistence economies (Clastres 1989: 190). Involvement in international 
trade may thus seem contrary to Malana’s reported earlier self-sufficiency 
16 In November 2008 a devastating fire tore though the Sara Behr half of the village 
consuming the central temple and the Pujara’s house.
17 The Panchayat and the Pradhan are part of the modern state’s system of village 
government and operate quite separately from the village council, the Harchar and the 
Mundee.
18 I am grateful to Chappe Negi (of Negi’s Himalayan Adventures) and Lars Brodholt 
(University of Bergen) for their observations on contemporary Malana. 
19 ‘Glenu’ has offered his own account of the introduction of cannabis cultivation to 
Malana: Galeno 1998. Pensiere Grotteschi: riproduzione totale o partiale vietata. See also: 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/italian-suspect-in-drug-trade-arrested-near-
malana/706920/. Accessed 2nd August 2015. 
20 The Malani people’s rejection of outside authority and long tradition of providing 
sanctuary to criminals explains why foreigners such as ‘Glenu’ were able to remain 
undetected in Malana for such a long period.
21 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-26/chandigarh/41454552_1_
malana-cream-seeds-charas. Accessed 2nd August 2015. 
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and rejection of money as a medium of exchange. However, it need not 
necessarily be so. Parry and Bloch describe a tendency to postulate a 
fundamental division between non-monetary and monetary economies: 
‘this opposition gets elided with a series of other dichotomies – ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’, pre-capitalist and capitalist, gift economies and commodity 
economies, production for use and production for exchange – with money 
acting as a major catalyst of the ‘great transformation’ between them, or 
at least as a telling index of it’ (1989: 7). This tendency is apparent in the 
way that Malana has been viewed by the people of Kullu, by the state in 
colonial and independent India, and by trekkers and tourists attracted 
to Malana by tales of this independent, isolated and mysterious village 
republic. In this view Malana’s adoption of cash cropping might suggest a 
dramatic transformation from a relatively isolated ‘tribal’ community into 
the starting point of an international commodity chain. Against this, and 
accepting Scott’s view of deliberate separation as a political choice, might 
an alternative explanation of economic change in Malana be forwarded?
Rather than viewing them as romantic isolated entities Scott recognizes 
that ‘peripheral peoples had always been firmly linked economically to 
the lowlands and to world trade’ (2009: 4). However, borrowing from 
Clastres, he saw their ability to take advantage of agro-ecological niches 
in trading with nearby states was accompanied by, even dependent upon, 
the ability to avoid subordination as subjects of the state (Scott 2009: 334. 
24). I argue that although Malana’s cannabis based economy has a global 
extension, it remains firmly rooted in key aspects of Malani culture and 
social organisation that would be immediately familiar to Rosser. Parry 
and Block are critical of the commonly held notion that money has ‘an 
intrinsically revolutionary power which inexorably subverts the moral 
economy of “traditional” societies’ (1989: 12). Certainly this does not seem 
to have been the case in Malana. 
Anthropological approaches to exchange relations question the 
assumed divide between market (characterized by anonymous, short-
term exchanges) and community (characterized by long-term associations 
and solidarities both real and imagined). Stephen Gudeman suggests that 
instead of a binary divide we should recognize the mutual constitution of 
overlapping realms of community and market, the up-close and the far-
distant. ‘In one guise, economy is local and specific, constituted through 
social relationships and contextually defined values. In the other, it is 
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impersonal, even global, and abstracted from social context’. Arguing that 
both of these realms are ever-present ‘even the most market-driven actor 
– the national or global corporation – mixes the two realms and relies 
on the presence of communal relations and resources for its successes’ 
(2001: 1-2). Earlier, based on Rosser’s account, I described how the Malanis 
were able to engage with the state in particular ways. By maintaining 
an image of separation and backwardness they sought out advantage in 
negotiations. Might something similar be happening in the economic 
sphere?
Malana’s cannabis economy is, of course, illegal22. The police post 
on the road down from the village is supposed to prevent the sale 
and transportation of cannabis resin. There is a widespread rumour 
throughout Kullu District that the people of Malana give bribes to corrupt 
officials in order to reduce disruption to the export of Malana’s key cash 
crop. Even so, in the run-up to the harvest season each September, teams 
of police officers arrive in Malana and attempt to destroy standing fields 
of cannabis plants. I arrived in the village the day after one such raid had 
taken place. The response was that such police actions would not deter 
the villagers from continuing to engage in their illicit but lucrative trade. I 
was told that because everybody in Malana cultivated cannabis there was 
no possibility that the police would be able to destroy the entire harvest. 
Those families unlucky enough to have been targeted would have their 
losses compensated by others in the village. Most significantly - from the 
point of view of this article - was the belief among people in Malana that 
the police were afraid to attack the village because of the power of Jamlu23. 
During visits police officers would be verbally threatened and such abuse 
might, on occasion, extend to physical violence. While recognising that 
such disruption might not halt an ongoing raid it was thought it would 
reduce the likelihood of future police interference. Police attacks on 
the cannabis crop were ‘only for show’ and not a serious attempt to 
disrupt production. That Malana continues to be recognised as ‘different’ 
and ‘special’ would seem to be confirmed by a senior district official’s 
22 The Indian government’s 1985 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 
prohibits the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, 
warehousing, concealment, use or consumption of charas (cannabis resin).
23 Rosser himself offers an oral account of a punitive expedition by the British which sees 
the invaders driven off by a swarm of angry bees sent by Jamlu (1956: 36). 
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description of the village as ‘India’s first independent village republic’24 
which was best regulated with a light touch. Malana’s egalitarianism, its 
hostile image and collective ritual and cultural unity under Jamlu persist 
in ways that underpin its economic system even today. 
The continued existence of a communal and collective dimension 
in Malana’s economy suggests a successful integration of supposedly 
‘traditional’ practices and ideologies into international systems of 
marketing and exchange. In the past the Malana’s economy depended 
on the extraction of kar from other villages around the Parbati and Kullu 
valleys. Now, though the direction of the raids is reversed, resistance to 
interference and hostility to external authority all work to sideline the 
state and allow cannabis to be cultivated. So too does the sharing of risk 
offered by widespread production and pooled compensation. Looking 
beyond ecological suitability, we might see cannabis cultivation as a niche 
activity made possible by the existence of a unified political collective 
able to establish and defend the space in which individual economic 
transactions take place. Though part of an international system of trade, 
in its illegality cannabis production belongs to an ‘alternative’ economy 
that fits well with Malana’s ‘alternative’ polity. 
As we have seen, rather than isolated and remote, it is more plausible 
to view Malana as squarely located within wider social, religious and 
economic structures25. Whether through the extraction of kar or the 
cultivation of cannabis, Malana’s prosperity was and is dependent on a 
selective engagement with certain external elements and a rejection of 
others. The suggestion of rejection of the wider (mainstream) culture 
paradoxically allows the people of Malana to function as an inalienable 
part of it. Malana’s counter culture is reflected in a counter economy, now 
as in the past. Rosser would not have known the term, but the Malani 
people might better be characterised as hippies than as hermits. 
24 Personal communication. 16th September 2013. 
25 Shneiderman makes a similar point about the Thangmi of Nepal who simultaneously 
situate themselves to make strategic and political claims on the state while remaining 
deeply committed to the ‘ungoverned aspects of their identity in cultural and 
psychological terms (2010: 292)
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Searching for Utopia in Zomia
Arjun Appadurai identifies one of the most problematic legacies of western 
social science is its sense of a single moment that marks a dramatic and 
unprecedented break between the past and the present. It is a view that 
has been shown to ‘distort the meaning of change and the politics of 
pastness’ (1996: 3). While Scott questions the characteristics attributed 
to ‘the traditional’ highland society and ‘the modern’ lowland state to 
recognise the agency of the former, he does so in ways that arguably 
reinforce the binary between the two. Updating Rosser’s work to take 
account of the altered context of the 21st century allows us to move beyond 
simple evolutionary notions of progress to see the culture of Malana not 
as an isolated leftover but a dynamic product of involvement with the 
wider world. The Malanis retention of their distinctive ‘tribal’ community 
identity should not be understood as static timeless tradition; but nor is 
it located simply in geographical space, whether state or non-state. Here 
we see that ‘globalization is itself a deeply historical, uneven, and even 
localizing process’ (ibid: 17).
Though Scott specified a time limit on the survival of Zomia, his own 
earlier works on infrapolitics and everyday resistance strongly suggest 
that the modernization process might be proceeding less effectively than 
its proponents forecast (Michaud 2010: 214). The Malana people’s social 
distinctiveness has been reconfigured rather than effaced by change. 
The way the Malanis represent themselves to the outside world shows 
a sophisticated understanding of the symbolism of tradition, isolation 
and separateness. They deploy and strategically manipulate their image 
to encourage certain aspects of engagement but ward off threats of 
assimilation or the assertion of government control. Isolation is here not a 
social fact but rather a political strategy that appears to have changed little 
over time. As such, to borrow a phrase from Formoso (2010), the people 
of Malana are neither Zomian – in the sense of being uncompromising 
rebels – but zombies, unable to adapt. Whether through tourism or the 
trade in cannabis, Malana’s engagement with modernity continues to be a 
communal and a creative process.
If the Malanis are not the pure Zomians of Scott’s imagination, 
then what insights might Malana offer for understandings of the state 
- especially in its ‘mature’ form - that came into being after the Second 
World War? Does Scott’s pessimistic view that new forms of governance 
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have finally allowed the state to penetrate Zomia ring true in Malana? 
In contemporary borderland regions it remains difficult to think of 
the nation state as the natural context and container for all social and 
political processes. Farrelly (2013) questions the need of states to project 
the technologies of control over ‘unimportant hamlets, by the sides 
of little creeks, on lonely mountain passes’ (ibid: 200). Against Scott’s 
geographically uniform technologies of control he instead recognises a 
series of nodes of state power: ‘[I]n the political systems of contemporary 
Zomia there is a process of hardening the state in places that matter and 
withdrawing from places that do not’ (ibid). To date, the contemporary 
state has, for whatever reason, opted not to impose its disciplinary 
power onto all aspects of Malani life all of the time. On the other hand at 
different times and with different motivations, the people of Malana have 
both accepted and rejected state interventions, made demands on the 
state and also sought to evade its discipline. In the upper Malana valley, as 
elsewhere, the dynamics of state society relations remain temporally and 
spatially variable. 
Scott borrowed the term Zomia from the Dutch historian Willem 
van Schendel but applied it in a rather different way. While Scott’s work 
draws attention to the culture of non-state societies existing in montaigne 
Southeast Asia, van Schendel used the notion of Zomia to explore how 
areas are imagined and structured with centres and peripheries. In doing 
so Van Schendel promoted a reconsideration of the inter-relationships 
of borderlands as part of dynamic processes that span local, regional and 
global levels. This article updates Rosser’s description of a ‘hermit village’ 
to move Malana away from Scott’s utopian vision of a non-state space to a 
more van Schendelian recognition of how the people of Malana negotiate 
multiple cultural, political and economic zones. Rosser’s work shows the 
existence of a border between state and society to be a fiction that suited 
both the Malanis and the authorities in Kullu town. The temporal border 
suggested by Scott which placed a time limit on Zomia’s existence is in 
fact highly permeable so that degrees of statelessness existed in the past 
and continue into the present day. However they do not necessarily exist 
in the same form. It seems highly likely that Scott’s Zomians have been 
changed by contemporary connections beyond ‘the border’. It is possible, 
however, that such engagements actually sustain rather than undermine 
the existence of non-state space.
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